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A B S T R A C T
We present a novel approach for measuring democracy based on Support Vector Machines,
a mathematical algorithm for pattern recognition. The Support Vector Machines Democracy
Index (SVMDI) is continuous on the [0,1] interval and enables very detailed and sensitive
measurement of democracy for 185 countries in the period between 1981 and 2011. Appli-
cation of the SVMDI yields results which highlight a robust positive relationship between
democracy and economic growth. We argue that the ambiguity in recent studies mainly orig-
inates from the lack of sensitivity of traditional democracy indicators. Analyzing transmission
channels through which democracy exerts its inﬂuence on growth, we conclude that demo-
cratic countries feature better educated populations, higher investment shares, and lower
fertility rates, but not necessarily higher levels of redistribution.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Today, the belief in democracy and its positive effects on freedom, liberty, and wealth is widespread among citizens of
different countries. Covering preferences of the vast majority of the world’s citizens, the World Value Survey (2014) ﬁnds that
79% of the global population wish to live in a country that is governed democratically.1 This preference is not only prevalent
in countries with a long democratic tradition (United States: 78.7%, Sweden: 91.9), but can also be found in Islamic states
(Pakistan: 78.3, Malaysia: 86.6), African nations (Rwanda: 74.1, Zimbabwe: 86.1), South America (Chile: 83.4, Ecuador: 84.2),
and Asia (China: 80.6, South Korea: 86.0). Beginning in December 2010, the unfulﬁlled desire for democracy in the Arab World
(Egypt: 93.6, Yemen: 76.3) culminated in a wave of protests, riots, and demonstrations that spread throughout the nations of the
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: klaus.gruendler@uni-wuerzburg.de (K. Gründler), tommy.krieger@uni-konstanz.de (T. Krieger).
1 See question V140 of theWorld Value Survey’s 6thWave, conducted between 2010 and 2014: “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed
democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is not at all important and 10 means absolutely important what position would you choose?” The above numbers refer
to all respondents that respond to the question with a value of 7 or higher.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.05.005
0176-2680/ © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Please cite this article as: K. Gründler, T. Krieger, Democracy and growth: Evidence from a machine learning indicator,
European Journal of Political Economy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.05.005
2 K. Gründler, T. Krieger / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Arab League and the surrounding area. Driven by a fatigue with authoritarian rule, the desire for the improvement in economic
opportunities was one major trigger for the uprisings (see Campante and Chor, 2012).
While the majority of the citizens around the world seem to be quite conﬁdent that democracy brings with it an improve-
ment in living standards, academics in the ﬁelds of political science and economics could not disagree more about the effect of
democratization on economic growth. Gerring et al. (2005) summarize the related literature by concluding that “the net effect
of democracy on growth over the last ﬁve decades is negative or null”. More recently, some studies point to a positive effect of
democracy on the income level (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2014 and Madsen et al., 2015), whereas other studies still ﬁnd no positive
contribution (e.g. Murtin and Wacziarg, 2014).
In this paper, we provide evidence for a robust positive inﬂuence of democracy on economic growth.We argue that the ambi-
guity in the recent literature can ﬁrst and foremost be traced back to the composition of existing democracy indicators. Available
indices suffer from substantial methodological weaknesses, particularly with regard to the strategy employed to aggregate the
underlying secondary data. As a result, existing indicators do not react with suﬃcient sensitivity to political events and regime
changes.
This problem is ampliﬁed by the speciﬁcation of the applied estimation techniques. A large number of recent studies elim-
inate unobserved heterogeneity via Within-Group estimations or difference GMM. However, while the ﬁrst method yields a
considerable dynamic panel bias (Nickell, 1981), the latter is accompanied by dramatic eﬃciency losses if additional orthogo-
nality restrictions can be exploited (see Blundell and Bond, 1998). Even more crucial, when estimating empirical models using
transformations that remove the information in the equation in levels, it is particularly necessary to utilize democracy indicators
that react very sensitively to political events and regime changes. Otherwise, relying on the limited within-country information
in the panel is likely to yield ambiguous results concerning the growth effect of democratization.
This paper addresses both challenges. In the ﬁrst step, we introduce a novel approach to measure democracy which is
based on machine learning algorithms for pattern recognition. The advantage gained via application of these algorithms is that
they give computers the ability to learn without being explicitly programmed. Whereas the machine learning toolbox pro-
vides numerous promising instruments, Support Vector Machines (SVM) in particular have recently produced striking results in
various branches of science, e.g. for categorization of cancer cells (Guyon et al., 2002) and identiﬁcation of biomarkers of neu-
rological and psychiatric disease (Orrù et al., 2012). We transfer the SVM approach to the problem of democracy measurement,
obtaining an index which we refer to as the Support Vector Machines Democracy Indicator (SVMDI). The indicator is continuous
on the interval from 0 to 1, thereby considerably enhancing the level of detail. The most important improvement, however, is
that the aggregation of the underlying secondary variables is not arbitrary, as our SVM algorithm puts the problem of learning—
i.e. the evaluation of country-years—into the context of an optimization problem. The SVMDI is available for 185 countries in
the period from 1981 to 2011, covering countries representative of over 99% of the global population.
In the second step, we analyze the effect of the SVMDI on economic growth in a system GMM framework which addresses
the econometric challenges described above. Our ﬁndings indicate a robust positive relationship between the SVMDI measure
and economic growth. This result remains stable when changing the estimation technique to some recently applied strategies
from the literature. In particular, accounting for waves of democratization via instrumental variable regressions using regional
and cultural democratization trends as external instruments strongly supports the baseline outcomes.
We also provide an extensive comparative analysis of the results obtained by SVMDI and alternative democracy indicators.
Given the inability of hitherto existing democracy indicators to react with suﬃcient sensitivity to political developments, the
SVMDI is the only indicator that suggests a positive effect on growth in models that rely on the within variation of countries.
This implies that even small steps in the transition process towards democracy are beneﬁcial for increases in living standards.
However, when using the system GMM framework of our baseline estimations, the positive association between democracy
and growth emerges as a clear empirical pattern, even when relying on rough measures of democratization.
Finally, we investigate the transmission channels through which democracy effects income increases. We observe that
democracy exerts its inﬂuence via better education, higher investment shares, and lower fertility rates. Meanwhile, we ﬁnd little
evidence for a redistribution-enhancing effect that would consequently contribute to an overall non-linear effect of democracy
(see Barro, 1996). Hence, our results imply that higher degrees of democratization are always beneﬁcial to growth.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the ambiguity in terms of the effect of democracy on growth in recent
studies. Section 3 critically analyzes the most commonly used traditional democracy indicators. In Section 4, we introduce
the ideas behind Support Vector Machines and the SVMDI algorithm. This section additionally provides an overview of the
democracy level and its historical trends in the world, and compares the SVMDI to alternative indicators. Section 5 is concerned
with the estimation strategy and the presentation of the empirical results. In Section 6, we examine the transmission channels
of democracy. We conclude in Section 7.
2. The ambiguous effect of democracy in recent studies
The effect of democracy on growth is strongly ambiguous in recent studies, both theoretically and empirically. On the theo-
retical side, it has been argued that democratization may beneﬁt growth, most importantly via better provision of public goods
and education (Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993, Benabou, 1996, and Lizzeri and Persico, 2004) or by imposing constraints on klepto-
cratic dictators and preventing political groups frommonopolizing lucrative economic opportunities (Acemoglu et al., 2008 and
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). In addition, Alesina et al. (1996) emphasize that increased political stability enhances national
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and foreign investment. Feng (1997) illustrates that democracy reduces the probability of regime changes, which indirectly ben-
eﬁts growth. However, a large body of literature emphasizes the possible negative effects of democratization, mainly as a result
of a higher level of redistribution, which is assumed to reduce growth (see, for instance, Alesina and Rodrik, 1994 and Persson
and Tabellini, 1994). In addition, Olson (1982) argues that suﬃcient organization of interest groups can lead to stagnation in
democracies.
Empirically, cross-sectional analyses conducted by Barro (1996) and Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) suggest a (slightly) neg-
ative effect of democracy on growth. The investigation of Barro (1996) also provides evidence for a nonlinear relationship
between the variables, where an increase in political rights at low levels of democratization beneﬁts growth, but triggers a neg-
ative effect if a critical threshold of democratization is exceeded. Barro (2003) conﬁrms the nonlinear effect using panel data,
while other panel data analyses yield quite ambiguous results. Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect of demo-
cratic transition on growth in the long-run, but emphasize short-run beneﬁts and a decline in economic volatility. Likewise,
Apolte (2011) reports ambiguous effects of democracy on prosperity in transition countries, tentatively arguing that basic con-
stitutional rights and constraints on the governmentmay be conducive to growth. Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994), Giavazzi and
Tabellini (2005) and Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) ﬁnd no robust indication of a positive relationship running from democracy
to growth. Using semi-parametric methods, Persson and Tabellini (2008) report an average negative effect of departure from
democracy on growth. Persson and Tabellini (2009) analyze the effect of democratic capital, measured by a nation’s historical
experience with democracy and by the incidence of democracy in its neighborhood. Whereas the results imply that democratic
capital stimulates growth, Acemoglu et al. (2014) argue that the formidable challenge in this case is the diﬃculty of disentangling
the impact of unobserved heterogeneity from the effect of democratic capital. Gerring et al. (2005) apply a similar approach,
concluding that democratization facilitates income increases. Providing a dichotomous index of democracy, Acemoglu et al.
(2014) ﬁnd that the degree of democracy is positively correlated with future GDP per capita. The authors use regional waves of
democratization in an IV approach to account for possible problems caused by endogeneity. A similar approach is employed by
Madsen et al. (2015), who use the strength of democracy in linguistically comparable countries as an external instrument. Both
approaches ﬁnd a positive link between democracy and the level of income.
A different branch of literature is concernedwith the reverse effect, i.e. the causal relationship of economic growth to democ-
racy. This literature goes back to Lipset (1959), who ﬁnds a strong and positive correlation between the level of income per
capita and the likelihood of transition to democracy. Recent studies, however, provide ambiguous results. While Acemoglu et al.
(2008, 2009) suggest that growth does not contribute to the process of democratization, Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) endorse
Lipset’smodernisation theory.
3. Recent democracy indicators
The traditional way to create a democracy indicator follows three steps: First, it is necessary to choose a deﬁnition of democ-
racy. Second, a number of instruments must be designed that are able to describe the properties of the theoretical concept.
Finally, a suitable manner for combining the selected variables must be found for computation of the democracy index (Munck
and Verkuilen, 2002).
In practical applications, however, a large number of problems arise in each of these steps. The ﬁrst issue concerns the
nature of democracy. With no generally accepted deﬁnition at hand, the interpretations range from minimal approaches pri-
marily focusing on the election process (see, e.g., Dahl, 1971) to concepts that additionally incorporate human rights and social
inequality (see, e.g., Rawls, 1971). As a result of this variety, the indicators deviate considerably in their underlying instru-
ments. For instance, the popular index of Vanhanen (2000) only utilizes two dimensions—participation and competitiveness in
elections—to characterize a democracy. The advantage of such a minimal concept is that data can be collected for a large num-
ber of countries and years, yielding a democracy indicator that covers a broad sample of observations. However, researchers
employing democracy data need to acknowledge the inherent cost-beneﬁt trade-off and must ensure that any substantial ana-
lytical conclusion drawn in the course of their investigation is consistent with the underlying data concept. In the case of the
Vanhanen-index, the allure of large data coverage comes at a high cost. First, instrumentation of participation and competition
via (respectively) voter turnout and the percentage of votes going to the largest party constitute, at best, poor measures of the
corresponding attribute (for a detailed discussion, see Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). Second, the aggregate index is obtained by
simply multiplying the two attributes, whereby Vanhanen (2000) does not offer any theoretical justiﬁcation for the arbitrary
assumption that equal weight ought to be assigned to the attributes.
A similar minimal concept is used in the index of Boix et al. (2013) that deﬁnes a country-year as democratic if it meets
three conditions in terms of contestation and participation.2 The drawback of this approach, one inherent to each dichotomous
indicator of democracy d{0,1}, is the lack of detail. In particular, the implicit assumption in empirical cross-country analyses is
that each country with d{0,1} = 1 is equally weighted in the computation of estimates. With regard to the Boix et al. (2013)
measure for the year 2010, this implies classifying Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Mali as having the same extent of democratization
as the United States, Germany, and Canada.
2 These conditions are: (1) the executive is elected in popular elections and is responsible to voters, (2) the legislature or the executive are elected in free and
fair elections, and (3) the majority of adult men have the right to vote.
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Two measures of democracy have achieved a particularly high degree of popularity. These are the Polity IV score provided
by Marshall et al. (2014) and the rating compiled by Freedom House (2014). Both approaches are neither dichotomous, nor
continuous. For Polity IV and Freedom House the range of possible values runs from −10 to 10 and from 2 to 14, respectively.
Although they differ in their purpose, both indices are quite similar in their construction, building on the evaluations of country
expertswho classify nations based on a set of predeﬁned criteria. In both cases, however, the aggregation strategy is problematic.
The Freedom House (2014) index aggregates scores for two attributes—political rights and civil liberty—by simply adding up
the values of their respective underlying components. With regard to each of the two attributes, all components are added
with equal weight without any theoretical justiﬁcation of this aggregation strategy. In fact, equal weighting seems particularly
inadequate in most cases.3 This failure to employ a reasonable aggregation rule is compounded by a number of conceptual and
measurement problems that are discussed in detail in Munck and Verkuilen (2002) and Cheibub et al. (2010). Arbitrariness of
the aggregation rule is also a fundamental deﬁciency of the Policy IV score (for a detailed discussion, see Treier and Jackman,
2008).
More recently, some scholars have attempted to achieve more reliable measures by synthesizing existing democracy indi-
cators. For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2014) propose an approach based on four established indices to obtain a dichotomous
indicator. According to the applied heuristic, a country-year is classiﬁed as democratic (d{0,1} = 1) if the rating of FreedomHouse
(2014) is free or partly free and the Polity IV score provided by Marshall et al. (2014) is greater than zero. To address the issue
that for certain observations only one of the underlying indicators is available, Acemoglu et al. (2014) use two additional indices
(Boix et al., 2013 and Cheibub et al., 2010) to classify the country-years in question. As in the case of the Boix et al. (2013)
measure, one main drawback of this method is that it enables only a binary classiﬁcation of democracy, which does not allow
for a nuanced distinction between different countries. Furthermore, a dichotomous indicator contradicts the broad consensus
that cultivation of a democracy is a process which occurs over a longer period of time. Treating each country-year as equally
(non)democratic neglects information about the process of democratization and results in a severe upward bias in empirical
estimations (Doucouliagos and Ulubas¸og˘lu, 2008).
Pemstein et al. (2010) propose another, more technical method to combine established indices. The basic idea underlying
this concept is to synthesize ten available democracy indicators via a Bayesian latent variable approach to obtain the Uniﬁed
Democracy Score (UDS). A formidable challenge presented by the inclusion of such a large number of indicators is ﬁnding an
appropriate way to deal with the fact that they differ substantially in terms of their number of evaluated countries and peri-
ods. For instance, the Polity IV score is available continuously for the time-period from 1945 to present, while other indices
are available only for few periods. Nevertheless, the approach of Pemstein et al. (2010) includes all available information for
each country-year, whereby the number of included secondary indicators varies from observation to observation. This, how-
ever, yields inconsistency in the UDS over time and across countries.4 In fact, a large number of the included national series
imply relatively constant democracy scores over time, only to be interrupted by a peak occurring almost every ﬁve years when
analyzing the time period between 1950 and 1980. This peak is due to the index of Bollen (2001), which is only included
in the UDS in the years 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, and 1980.5 A very similar bias that affects the UDS of a considerable num-
ber of countries can be observed in the early 1970s, the time period when the Freedom House (2014) ratings were initially
published.
The drawbacks discussed above may stand exemplary for the majority of the existing democracy indicators. While points of
criticism include the low level of detail, subjectivity and arbitrariness in the conceptualization, and the selection of the instru-
ments, the main concerns are the fairly low level of sophistication with regard to the aggregation process and the way in which
the underlying components are weighted.
4. Measuring democracy using Support Vector Machines
4.1. Motivation
Compared with other macroeconomic series—such as, for instance, the inﬂation rate, the unemployment rate, or the growth
rate—the quantiﬁcation of democracy is considerably more challenging, since there is neither a commonly accepted deﬁnition
of democracy nor a natural unit or scale by which it can be measured. The literature at hand has, however, arrived at the pre-
dominant consensus that it is preferable to measure the degree of democratization rather than quantify the stock of democracy,
where the usage of scales with lower and upper bounds chosen a priori as benchmarks for the lowest (fully autocratic) and
highest (fully democratic) possible degree is common. Mindful of this preference, traditional democracy indicators attempt to
determine a number of requirements which a country has to fulﬁll to reach a certain degree of democratization, as opposed to
trying to observe democracy directly.6 More formally, the degree of democratization di,t ∈ D ⊆ R of country i in period t can
3 For instance, it is questionable whether the decentralization of power is as important for democracy as the actual power exercised by elected representatives
(Munck and Verkuilen, 2002).
4 Although for some country years the UDS was produced by drawing on information from ten democracy indicators, the majority of observations rely on
an average of six underlying indicators which deviate in their composition for different country-years. This restricts comparison of UDS scores across countries
and over time.
5 See the online Appendix of the paper for a graphical illustration of this effect.
6 In this context, democracy is frequently interpreted as a latent variable (see, e.g., Pemstein et al., 2010).
Please cite this article as: K. Gründler, T. Krieger, Democracy and growth: Evidence from a machine learning indicator,
European Journal of Political Economy (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.05.005
K. Gründler, T. Krieger / European Journal of Political Economy xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 5
ARTICLE IN PRESS
be expressed as a function F : X ⊆ Rm → D ⊆ R of the extent to which the country-year satisﬁes the selected conditions.
Subsequently, we refer to these conditions as xi,t =
(
x1i,t , . . . , x
m
i,t
)′ ∈ X ⊆ Rm, wherem denotes the number of requirements, i.e.
di,t = F
(
x1i,t , . . . , x
m
i,t
)
∀(i, t). (1)
A basic property of the frequently used scales is that their range of values can be normalized to the [0, 1] interval without the
loss of essential information.7 Hence, we subsequently focus on the case in which the output space is normalized, i.e.D = [0, 1].
This provides the advantage that each absolute change in the indicator can directly be interpreted as the change in the degree
of democratization.
We have already explained in Section 3 that the low degree of sophistication with respect to the aggregation function F( • )
is undoubtedly a substantial methodological weak point of existing democracy indicators. Hence, ﬁnding a suitable strategy
to detect the unknown function F( • ) without arbitrary assumptions is an essential step to improve the quality of democracy
indicators. By using Support Vector Machines, we transfer the problem of aggregation into an optimization context, estimating
the most appropriate function F( • ). In fact, machine learning algorithms and Support Vector Machines are explicitly designed
for problems where the functional form is unknown and where researchers do not have any reasonable description of the
functional relationship between the inputs and the desired response (see Steinwart and Christmann, 2008). To construct a
statistical learning machine with Support Vectors (SV), two essential requirements must be met. First, we need a set of input
characteristics that are available for all observations in the sample. Second, we need a limited number of observations with
known output, on the basis of which the algorithm can learn (see Steinwart and Christmann, 2008).
Intuitively, our approach ﬁrst identiﬁes country-years that can be indisputably categorized as highly democratic or highly
autocratic and uses them as observations with known output. Based on these a priori labeled observations and a set of observable
characteristics, we compute the aggregation function F( • ) via Support Vector regressions. The underlying attributes include
different aspects of political participation, political competition, and civil rights. Finally, we obtain a continuous measurement
of democracy, which we refer to as the Support Vector Machines Democracy Indicator (SVMDI). This indicator can be interpreted
as the degree of democratization based on a continuous scale reaching from 0 to 1.
4.2. Machine learning and Support Vector Machines
The ﬁeld of machine learning studies algorithms that operate on the basis of a model drawn from example inputs that is then
used to make data-driven predictions or decisions (see, e.g., Bishop, 2006). The enormous advantage gained through application
of such methods is that of providing computers with the ability to learn without being explicitly programmed (Samuels, 1959).
Largely developed at AT&T Bell Laboratories, the Support Vector Machines (SVM) algorithm as a subﬁeld of machine learning
was designed to have a ﬁrm orientation towards real-world application. Hence, utilization of SVM has achieved very promising
results in various branches of sciences. Application of SVM has proven highly effective in accomplishing such practical tasks
as categorization of cancer cells (Guyon et al., 2002), classiﬁcation of hyperspectral data in geophysics (Gualtieri, 2009), and
identiﬁcation of biomarkers of neurological and psychiatric disease (Orrù et al., 2012). In addition, the algorithm has been used
to categorize texts (Joachims, 2002) and to analyze hand written characters (Cortes and Vapnik, 1995).8
The machine learning toolbox consists of a wide range of different algorithms. In our application, we use two common
methods of SV regression and SV classiﬁcation. While the regression tool is essential for obtaining the desired aggregation
function, SV classiﬁcation is used to conduct validity tests of our selections. This section provides a brief description of how
to use Support Vector Machines for regressions, and the concept of SV classiﬁcation can be seen to be closely related. It bears
underscoring, however, that the mathematical literature on machine learning has developed considerably over time, which is
why the following description concentrates primarily on its basic ideas. For readers with a broader interest in the mathematical
and computational issues of SVM, we recommend the inspirational work of Vapnik (1998), Smola and Schölkopf (2004), and
Steinwart and Christmann (2008).
The problem to be solved by the SV regression tool can be described as follows: Given a certain data set F =
{(x1, y1); . . . ; (xn, yn)}, where xi ∈ X ⊂ Rm and yi ∈ R, we want to ﬁnd a function f : X ⊂ Rm → Rwith the property
f(xi) = yi ∀ i = 1, . . . ,n. (2)
7 For instance, the Polity IV Index originally ranges from −10 to 10 (Marshall et al., 2014). It is possible to obtain a normalized score for each country-year Pit
with the same information via computation of Pit+1020 .
8 Thus far, little effort has been made to apply the SVM algorithm in the ﬁeld of economics, where up until now its application has been restricted to ﬁnancial
topics and stock markets. For instance, Kim (2003) and Tay and Cao (2001) use SVM for ﬁnancial time-series forecasting and Shin et al. (2005) apply the method
in a bankruptcy prediction model.
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However, due to measurement errors and unobserved characteristics, achieving a perfect ﬁt is generally not feasible. For
this reason, the aim of SV regression is to compute a function fˆ : X ⊂ Rm → R which approximates the “true” function
f : X ⊂ Rm → R such that
1. the deviation between fˆ(xi) and yi does not exceed a given level e for each observation i, and (simultaneously)
2. the shape of fˆ( • ) is as ﬂat as possible (Smola and Schölkopf, 2004).
Largely inﬂuenced by the Generalized Portrait algorithm (Vapnik and Chervonenkis, 1964, Vapnik and Lerner, 1963), the
basic idea of SV regressions is to ﬁnd a hyperplane inX that satisﬁes these two requirements. However, the functional ﬂexibility
of hyperplanes typically limits the possibility of obtaining precise approximations for all observations in the sample. As a result,
the ﬁrst condition is violated in most cases. To resolve this issue, Boser et al. (1992) suggest using a higher dimensional spaceH
instead of X—called feature space—where shifting of the data is accomplished via a nonlinear feature map V( • ) : X → H that is
chosen a priori.
This procedure, however, gives rise to the question of how to treat the high-dimensional spaceH, since an appropriate map
V( • ) is typically unknown. In addition, this approach can easily become computationally infeasible with respect to polynomial
features of higher order or higher dimensionalilty. Boser et al. (1992) propose a method to overcome this problem, which has
become known as the kernel trick, largely building on the idea initially introduced by Aizerman et al. (1964). The approach
circumvents direct construction of the hyperplane based on the data inH and relies instead on the dot products of the Support
Vectors (Vapnik, 1998). This method is feasible if there exists an admissible kernel k : X ×X → R that satisﬁes a certain number
of conditions.9 In our application, we use the Gaussian Radial Basis Function as a kernel, with the result that the corresponding
feature spaceH becomes a Hilbert space of inﬁnite dimension.
In this way, the optimal SV regression function can be calculated via
fˆ(x) =
n∑
i=1
(
ai − a∗i
)
k(x,xi) + b (3)
where b denotes the intercept, and the Lagrange multipliers a = (a1, . . . ,an)′ and a∗ =
(
a∗1, . . . ,a
∗
n
)′ are computed by solving
the optimization problem (Smola and Schölkopf, 2004)
max
a,a∗
−1
2
n∑
i,j=1
(ai − a∗i )(aj − a∗j )k(xi, xj) − e
n∑
i=1
(ai + a∗i ) +
n∑
i=1
yi(ai − a∗i )
s.t.
n∑
i=1
(ai − a∗i ) = 0 and ai,a∗i ∈ [0,C].
with given cost parameter C and ﬁxed margin e.
4.3. The SVMDI algorithm
In this section, we transfer the general approach of SV regression to the problemof quantifying the degree of democratization.
In the ﬁrst step, we need to specify a set of input attributes (x) that capture the character of democracies and that are available
for each observation in the sample. This selection is based on a broad concept of democracy, i.e. we do not exclusively focus on
the core elements of political participation and political competition (as, for instance, proposed by Dahl, 1971), but also include
civil liberty and independence of non-government institutions such as the judiciary and the press. In this sense we follow a large
body of theoretical literature which argues that democracy requires more than just a free general election process (see, e.g.,
Rawls, 1971 and Diamond et al., 1990).
In his well-known work, Vanhanen (2000) suggests quantifying the degree of political competition based on the share of
power concentrated in the largest political party in the last general election. How to measure this share is, however, ambiguous.
In fact, it seems plausible to either use the share obtained at the ballot box or, alternatively, to rely on the share of seats in
the parliament. Both shares may be relatively similar in the majority of cases, but differ considerably with respect to certain
country-years. For instance, the 2002 Turkish general election saw 34.28% of all valid votes go to the Justice and Development
Party (AKP) chaired by Recep Tyyip Erdog˘an. This, however, led to their acquiring 66% of all seats in parliament (Carr, 2014).
After analyzing the bibliography of Vanhanen (2000), we unfortunately found severe data inconsistencies in the competition
dimension over time and across countries, for which reason we refrain from utilization of this database. Instead, we collect the
necessary information from other sources that distinguish between both shares in the majority of cases. To obtain additional
information concerning the degree of political competition, we further calculate the ratio of votes and the ratio of parliamentary
9 See, in particular, the Theorem of Mercer (1909) and the Theorems of Schoenberg (1942) and Burges (1999). For a detailed overview and discussion, see
Smola and Schölkopf (2004).
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seats between the strongest and second strongest parties. In total, we obtain four variables to characterize the competition
dimension of democracy.10
The second attribute is political participation, which we include based on voter turnout (Vanhanen, 2000), the rating of politi-
cal freedom provided by Freedom House (2014), and an indicator of political oppression and violence computed by Gibney et al.
(2013).11 In addition, independence of the judiciary is reﬂected by the INJUD series from the database of Cingranelli et al. (2014),
while the freedom of the press indicator is obtained from Freedom House (2014). Finally, the quality of civil liberties is evalu-
ated by two expert-based ratings provided by Freedom House (2014) and Cingranelli et al. (2014). The attribute drawn from the
Cingranelli et al. (2014) compilation is based on the mean value of ﬁve scores regarding essential human rights.
In light of the critique directed at traditional democracy indicators (see Section 3), we select these eleven variables cautiously
with respect to the crucial issue of data quality. Whenever feasible, we avoid inclusion of aggregated data by drawing on the
original series. In addition, by inclusion of various series from different sources, we counterbalance their individual weaknesses,
at least to some extent. Yet it bears underscoring that the accuracy of the SVMDI depends on the attributes that are used as
input variables.
In the second step, we select a subset of country-years L ⊂ F consisting of elements that can unambiguously be categorized
as either highly democratic or highly autocratic. This selection of preliminary degrees of democratization lays the foundation
for the SV algorithm. At this point, we follow the seminal work of Ragin (2000, 2008), which suggests using 0.05 (0.95) for
highly autocratic (highly democratic) observations as appropriate benchmarks.12 In order to compile L, we follow Acemoglu et
al. (2014) by using the Polity IV score (Marshall et al., 2014) as decision criterion. However, in our case, a country-year is labeled
as democratic only if the Polity IV index assumes its highest possible value of 10. At the other end of the spectrum, we classify
countries as autocratic if the Polity IV indicator is −7 or below, as suggested by Jaggers and Gurr (1995).13
Subsequently (step 3), a random generator selects tdemo and tauto elements of L and consolidates them into the training
set Tf . To avoid arbitrary assumptions, both parameters are chosen by a uniformly distributed random number generator. The
algorithm proceeds (step 4) by conducting a SV regression based on the observations in Tf , yielding a nonlinear function FTf :
X ⊂ R11 → [0, 1].14 For computation of FTf ( • ), we use the broadly accepted Gaussian Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel, which
has provided the most promising results in our robustness checks. In the ﬁfth step, we use the estimated aggregation function
FTf ( • ) to assign a degree of democratization dit ∈ [0, 1] to all country-years included in our sample F .15 To prevent a potential
selection bias, we compute f = 1, . . . , 2000 iterations of the process from step 3 to 5. This bootstrapping procedure ensures
numerical robustness with respect to our parameter selection, accounts for potential measurement errors in the underlying
data, and enables the estimation of conﬁdence intervals.16 The Support Vector Machines Democracy Index (SVMDI) is the average
value over the 2000 iterations for each country-year, yielding a continuous measurement of democracy that ranges from 0 to 1.
For a given country-year 〈i, t〉, the SVMDI indicates the degree of democratization with respect to our liberal concept of
democracy and the benchmark country-years included in the classiﬁcation. Due to the availability of the underlying data, the
SVMDI is computable for 185 countries in the period from 1981 to 2011. To account for a potential bias due to inexact quan-
tiﬁcation, potential measurement errors in the underlying data, and omitted variables, we compute conﬁdence intervals for our
SVMDI point estimates as urged by Treier and Jackman (2008). The lower (upper) bound of these intervals corresponds with
the 5th (95th) percentile of the simulated distribution of the point estimate that is compiled for each country-year based on the
2000 iterations. The SVMDI scores and the associated conﬁdence intervals can be accessed in the online Appendix of this article.
4.4. Democracy in the world
We now turn to a detailed illustration of the democratic tendencies in the world implied by our indicator. Fig. 1 maps the
SVMDI data in the post-2010 period. This presents a very heterogeneous picture: while countries in Europe, Oceania, North
10 The secondary datasets used include African Election Database (2014), Carr (2014), IPU (2014), IDEA (2014), Nohlen (2005), Nohlen et al. (2001), Nohlen
and Stöver (2010), Nohlen et al. (1999), and World Bank (2014a).
11 By using different sources and variables, we try to counterbalance themethodological shortcomings of the inputmeasurements, conceding that this strategy
does not remove all issues. However, no better data is available for the large number of observations included in our sample.
12 Undoubtedly, the assignment of the thresholds is to some extent arbitrary, which is why we conducted the algorithm with several different thresholds,
ranging from 0 to 0.1 (0.9 to 1). The results turn out to be relatively unaffected by the particular choice. In each case, the algorithm is able to detect substantial
differences in the degree of democratization in both of the subsamples that have received a preliminary label. We illustrate this issue in Section 4.5 based on the
example ofMongolia. Note also that the empirical results in terms of the democracy-growth nexus explored in this paper are not sensitive to different thresholds.
13 Since the selection of the Polity IV index as a criterion seems arbitrary, we check the robustness of the classiﬁcation by using several other criteria based on
other democracy indicators. These changes yield little differences in the resulting indicator, which is hardly surprising given the high agreement of established
democracy indicators with respect to the top and the bottom of the global democracy distribution. As an additional internal validity check, we conduct SV
classiﬁcations based on the input variables to examine if there are differences in the initial labels compared to those obtained by usage of the Polity IV indicator.
This analysis reveals very little indication of any mislabeled country-years.
14 To ensure that the estimated function can reach all values between 0 and 1 without penalization through the SV regression, we set the margin parameter e
as equal to 0.05. In addition, we follow Mattera and Haykin (1999) and set the penalization parameter C equal to to 1. However, our robustness checks showed
that the SVMDI is only weakly affected by the particular parameter choice.
15 From a theoretical perspective, it is possible that some of the predicted values are above the upper bound 1 or below the lower bound 0. To avoid such cases,
we include an additional restriction in our implementation, ensuring scores between 0 and 1. In our application, only 0.2% of the estimated values lie outside
the [0, 1] interval.
16 The combination of bootstrapping and SVM is frequently used in the literature (see, e.g., Alonso-Atienza et al., 2012, Jain et al., 2014 andWang andMa, 2012).
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Fig. 1. Democracy in the world (SVMDI), post-2010 period.
America, and—to a large extent—in South America possess high SVMDI scores, a substantial part of the nations in Africa and Asia
are classiﬁed as being considerably less democratic.
An interesting pattern revealed by Fig. 1 is that the degree of democratization shows a clear tendency towards regional con-
centration. If a country is (non-)democratic, we observe a high probability that the same applies to its neighboring countries.
There are three remarkable exceptions to this general rule: surrounded by countries with very low SVMDI scores, Mongolia
(SVMDI: 0.8755), Ghana (0.9295), and—to a lesser extent—Benin (0.8296) succeeded in establishing democratic structures.
Overall, the ﬁgure suggests that the extent of democratization is quite polarized.
This polarization becomes particularly apparent when we consider the distribution of the SVMDI measure, illustrated in
Fig. 2. The data suggests a bimodal distribution, where the ﬁrst mode is located at a very low level of democracy, and the second
mode lies at a substantially higher degree of democratization. This pattern is typical when examining the degree of democra-
tization across countries and occurs in a similar manner when analyzing alternative measures. The reason is that there exist a
substantial number of countries with an SVMDI index close to zero. This group includes nations where civil war is prevalent—
e.g. Sudan (0.0449), Syria (0.0633), and Afghanistan (0.0889)—and countries with absolute monarchies, such as Brunei (0.0477),
Qatar (0.0504), and Swaziland (0.0515). On the other hand, there are numerous countries where strong democratic institu-
tions have been established, particularly in Europe, North America, Oceania, and in some parts of Latin America. Fig. 2 also
demonstrates that democratization emerges as a clear empirical pattern in the SVMDI data. Whereas the relative fraction of
non-democratic nations was extraordinarily high in the 1980–1984 period, the data approximate amore uniform distribution in
the post-2010 period, where we observe a substantially higher number of democratic countries and a lower number of nations
with poor SVMDI scores.
Fig. 2. Democracy in the World, SVMDI data, kernel density estimates 1980—2010. Kernel is Epanechnikov.
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Fig. 3. The path of democratization. SVMDI scores and conﬁdence intervals of Serbia, South Korea, Venezuela and Argentina, whole period (1981–2011).
Fig. 3 plots the SVMDI scores and the conﬁdence intervals for Serbia, South Korea, Venezuela, and Argentina over the entire
period from 1981 to 2011.17 The ﬁgure highlights the considerable progress in democratization during the 1980s and the early
1990s, which later became known as “Democracy’s Third Wave” (see, for instance, Huntington, 1991, 2012). Beginning in Latin
America in the early 1980s, the Third Wave washed over to Asia Paciﬁc countries and reached its crest in Eastern Europe after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. This development is clearly visible in the SVMDI data. Particularly noteworthy is the substantial
progress achieved in South Korea and Argentina, both of which were classiﬁed as highly autocratic in the early 1980s. Similar
movements towards democracy can be observed in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. The Serbian path
to democracy, however, was more tortuous than those of its Baltic and East-Central European neighbors. Only following the
resolution of the armed conﬂicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995) and Kosovo (1998–99) was an increase in political
rights and democratization initiated (see Nohlen and Stöver, 2010). Still, democracy has not yet been cultivated in full, which is
exactly reﬂected in the SVMDI of the country (Greenberg, 2014).
A further issue that has gained increasing attention is the fear of a potential “reverse” wave occurring in Latin America due
to the importance of autocracy and military in the region’s political culture, as well as the strong institutional position of its
armed forces (see Zagorski, 2003). While similar movements were ushered in in large parts of South America during the 1960s
and 1970s (e.g. in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay), Venezuela was not affected by this cross-national reduction in democratic
structures (Huntington, 2012). As a result, the Venezuelan SVMDI was well above the Latin American average in the early 1980s.
However, beginning in the late 1980s, the stable democracy in Venezuela frequently came under attack, e.g. by multiple popular
uprisings, the ﬁrst of which began in 1989, followed by two coup attempts in 1992 and the eventual impeachment of President
Carlos Andrés Pérez (1989–1994). As a consequence, the quality of the country’s democratic institutions decreased considerably
(Romero, 1996). The decline gathered momentum during the presidency of Hugo Chávez (1999–2013). In his ﬁrst year in oﬃce,
Chávez abolished the elected government and transferred its power to an assembly more loyal to his interests (Brewer-Carías,
2010). The following years saw a clear tendency towards autocracy, which was promoted by the adoption of illiberal laws, the
constraint of the freedom of the press, and the repression of the political opposition (Corrales, 2015).
With the end of the military junta in 1983, Argentina succeeded in reestablishing its democratic institutions (Larkins, 1998).
This development is reﬂected in the sharp increase in the SVMDI. However, while Argentina’s democracy in the mid-1980s
was more stable than that of previous regimes, democratic institutions became weaker during the 1990s (Levitsky and Murillo,
2008). In fact, President Carlos Menem (1989–1999) increasingly limited both the power of the congress and the indepen-
dence of the Supreme Court (Larkins, 1998), resulting in Argentina’s movement towards a delegative democracy shaped by weak
control mechanisms between different state agencies (O’Donell, 1994). With the continuation of presidential dominance and
17 Note that the Serbian SVMDI is composed of the scores of SFR Yugoslavia (1981–91), FR Yugoslavia (92–02), Serbia and Montenegro (03–05), and Serbia
(06–11).
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Fig. 4. Democracy in Jamaica, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Mongolia. SVMDI and traditional democracy indicators, 1980–2011.
centralization of power (Elias, 2015; Levitsky and Murillo, 2008), Argentina’s political institutions remain weakened under the
presidency of Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007) and his wife Christina Fernández de Kirchner (2007–2015).
4.5. Relation to existing democracy indicators
One huge advantage of the SVMDI algorithm is that aggregation of the underlying attributes is less arbitrary than with
recently used strategies, as it relies on weaker assumptions. In particular, uniﬁcation of attributes is conducted via a nonlin-
ear optimization problem rather than via crude aggregation rules or the implicit assumption of equal weights. In addition,
combining information from different data sources compensates for weaknesses in conceptualization as well as for potential
measurement errors in the underlying secondary data. A direct result of thesemethodical improvements is a substantial increase
in the level of detail in comparison with established approaches.
To demonstrate the superiority of the SVMDI algorithm, Fig. 4 plots the democracy levels of Jamaica, Nicaragua, Venezuela,
and Mongolia as gauged by SVMDI and several other indicators. Note that we have normalized all indices to values between 0
and 1 in order to ensure suﬃcient comparability of the measurements.18
First, consider the case of Jamaica.What is striking in terms of the classiﬁcation of the Jamaican democracy is the considerable
divergence between the trends observed in the early 1980s by the SVMDI and those identiﬁed by alternative measures. While
the Polity scores and the Freedom House (2014) ratings do not change notably, the SVMDI score experiences a sharp decline in
the year 1983. Given the political situation in that year, the result suggested by the SVMDI algorithm is much more plausible.
In 1983, the “People’s National Party”—until that time the largest opposition group in the parliament—boycotted the election,
which resulted in the incumbent “Jamaica Labor Party”winning all seats in the parliament (Figueros, 1985). In fact, whereas 54 of
60 seats were completely unopposed, voting took place for six seats due to participation of minor parties. However, nationwide
voter turnout was only 2.7%, which was the lowest value in the history of the country and the only time that it was below
50% (Wüst, 2005). From that time until 1989, Jamaica was a de facto one-party state. Such a situation, however, should factor
negatively into a democracy measure, as political pluralism in parliament is an important aspect of democracy, even in minimal
concepts such as that proposed by Dahl (1971). Without the control and criticism provided by a parliamentary opposition, the
ruling party is able to exercise powerwithout supervision. In fact, the rule of Edward Seaga, PrimeMinister of Jamaica from 1980
to 1989, became increasingly authoritarian, which led to widespread public protest during the election in 1989 (Wüst, 2005).
The case of Nicaragua highlights a typical pattern of the Vanhanen (2000) index, which in the overwhelming majority of
observations only changes (slightly) after elections have taken place. In Nicaragua, elections are held every ﬁve years. While
the Vanhanen-index implies an increase in democracy in each electoral year, it remains unaltered during the interim period.
In particular, with the exception of a minor decline in 2011, the index provides no indication of a decrease in the degree of
18 It is crucial to emphasize that the superiority of the SVMDI score in describing recent political developments is not limited to the illustrated countries, but
can be observed with respect to the overwhelming majority of country-years included in the data.
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democracy during the entire period. Likewise, the Polity score (Marshall et al., 2014) implies a similar period of ﬂourishing
democracy without any indication of an interruption. The dichotomous indicator of Acemoglu et al. (2014) changes only once,
in 1990, the year when the ﬁrst competitive election in the country took place (Williams, 1990). Contrary to the consensus that
Nicaragua’s democracy is far from being in full bloom (Walker, 2009), the indicator suggests strong democratic structures in
the country. In contrast, the SVMDI displays a continuous loss of democracy since 2006, the year when Daniel Ortega came into
his second presidency after years as a member of the opposition. Due to the increasingly autocratic governance of President
Ortega—including, for instance, growing oppression of critical journalists and opposition members, as well as controversial
constitutional amendments (Anderson and Dodd, 2009, McConnell, 2014)—a decreasing trend is more justiﬁable than a constant
or even increasing level.
The third nation illustrated in Fig. 4 is Venezuela. As highlighted in Fig. 3 in the previous section, democratization in
Venezuela experienced a decline during the past decades. This phenomenon is intensely discussed in the literature as a “reverse
wave” of democracy. However, the breakdown of Venezuelan democracy is captured quite differently by traditional democracy
indicators. Whereas the indices of Boix et al. (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2014) attest to a thriving democracy until the end
of the 2000s, the index of Vanhanen (2000) remains at a constant level over the whole period between 1981 and 2011, indi-
cating no notable decline in democracy at all. The SVMDI, however, illustrates that the antidemocratic trend in Venezuela had
already begun during the 1990s, which is much more reﬂective of the existing literature (see, e.g., Zagorski, 2003 and Levitsky
and Murillo, 2008).
The last country depicted in Fig. 4 is Mongolia. The ﬁgure highlights that the SVMDI algorithm is able to detect differences
between country-years which had originally obtained a label in step two, i.e. observations that are elements of L. Although
Mongolia received a preliminary label for the period between 1999 and 2011, the ﬁgure clearly shows that the degree of democ-
racy has changed considerably during this time.19 What is striking about the ﬁgure is the sharp decline in the SVMDI of Mongolia
in 2000. In this particular year, the ex-communist Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) won 72 of 76 seats, resulting
in Mongolia’s shift towards a one-party system (Severinghaus, 2001). Such a development, however, stands in contrast to our
deﬁnition of democracy that—in line with a large body of literature—requires a multiple-party system. In fact, political compe-
tition is a central issue in theoretical and empirical concepts relating to democracy (see, for instance, Dahl, 1971, Huntington,
2012, Vanhanen, 2000). When the vote in the 2004 Mongolian parliamentary election was evenly split between the MPRP
and the Motherland Democratic Coalition, Mongolia’s SVMDI experienced a renewed increase. When relying on traditional
indicators—such as Polity IV and the measures of Vanhanen (2000) and Acemoglu et al. (2014)—no changes in democratization
are observable.
5. The empirical effect of democracy on growth
5.1. Estimation strategy
We now turn to the empirical investigation of democracy, as measured via the SVMDI algorithm, and growth. Our analysis
uses a standard framework of empirical growth regressions to estimate the effect of democracy on growth, utilizing 5-year aver-
ages of all variables. Averaging the data is necessary due to the long-term perspective of growth theory, the need to disentangle
short-term ﬂuctuations and long-term effects, and the occurrence of gaps in the data for some of the covariates. Considering
additive linkage of the variables, our basic dynamic panel speciﬁcation is20
yit = hyit−1 + khit + bXit + cdit + gi + nt + vit (4)
where yit is the log of initial per capita GDP in country i at 5-year period t, hit is human capital endowment, dit is the democracy
index, and Xit includes the covariates of the regression. The selection of the covariates is based on the standard framework of
Barro (2003, 2013), which has been proven to capture the empirical determinants of economic growth quite accurately in a
number of studies. These variables include the logarithmic value of real per capita GDP in (t − 1) to account for conditional
convergence, denoted by log(GDPpc); the investment share (INVS); government consumption (GOVC); the inﬂation rate (INFL);
the degree of openness (OPEN); and the log of the fertility rate, log(FERT). Human capital enters into the equation using average
years of schooling (SCHOOLY) and log(LIFEEX), the log of life expectancy at birth, to proxy education and health, respectively.21
We do not include measures of physical capital, as their calculation relies on arbitrary assumptions regarding depreciation and
the initial value. Rather, we follow Barro (2003, 2013) in assuming that higher levels of log(GDPpc) and hit reﬂect higher levels
of capital endowment.
19 In order to make these slight differences computable, we only use a subset Tf ⊂ L with |Tf |  |L| to estimate FTf ( • ) in iteration f and apply the SVM-
regression based on all country-years available in the sample. This procedure enables detection of possible differences between country-years that have been
classiﬁed as democratic (autocratic) in the second step.
20 This speciﬁcation is obtained by following the model structure developed in a number of recent empirical investigations, where the growth rate is modeled
to evolve as yit − yit−1 = (h− 1)yit−1 + khit + bXit + cdit + gi + nt + vit (see, e.g., Bond et al., 2001, Voitchovsky, 2005, and Halter et al., 2014).
21 The data used in the regression stem from commonly used data sources in empirical growth research. log(GDPpc), INVS, GOVC, OPEN and INFL are from PWT
8.0 as documented in Feenstra et al. (2015), SCHOOLY is from Barro and Lee (2013), log(LIFEEX) and log(FERT) are fromWorld Bank (2014b).
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Eq. (4) also captures country-speciﬁc effects gi and time effects of period t, denoted by nt, in order to account for the various
institutional aspects of the countries. The term vit ≡ uit − nt − gi denotes the idiosyncratic error of the model.
A common and widely-used approach to account for both unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity is to employ the esti-
mator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Deﬁne for reasons of lucidity that ∇k ≡ (kit − kit−1) and ∇2k ≡ (kit−1 − kit−2), the
basic idea of this approach is to adjust Eq. (4) to
∇y = h∇2y+ k∇h+ c∇d+ b∇X+ ∇n+ ∇v (5)
and then use suﬃciently lagged values of yit, hit, dit, and Xit as instruments for the ﬁrst-differences. However, ﬁrst differencing
Eq. (4) removes the information in the equation in levels. This drawback is particularly severe with regard to the purpose of this
paper, as the variation in democracy data stems to a large extent from the cross section rather than the time-dimension. This
particularly holds for hitherto existing democracy indicators. Blundell and Bond (1998) and Bond et al. (2001) show that the
standard ﬁrst-difference GMMestimator can be poorly behaved if time-series are persistent or if the relative variance of the ﬁxed
effects gi is high. The reason is that lagged levels in these cases provide only weak instruments for subsequent ﬁrst-differences,
resulting in a large ﬁnite sample bias. In addition, difference GMM magniﬁes gaps in unbalanced panels as it requires at least
three consecutive lags for each of the variables. This requirement results in an asynchronous loss of observations because data
availability is typicallymore limited in developing countries. However, we are particularly interested in observations concerning
developing economies, as these country-years contain information regarding the growth effect of regime change in transition
economies.
System GMM proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) provides a tool to circumvent the pre-
viously described biases, if one is willing to assume a mild stationary restriction on the initial conditions of the underlying data
generating process.22 In this case, additional orthogonality conditions for the level equation in Eq. (4) can be exploited using
lagged values of ∇k and ∇2k as instruments. By these means, system GMM maintains some of the cross-sectional information
in levels and exploits the information in the data more eﬃciently. Satisfying the Arellano and Bover (1995) conditions, system
GMM has been shown to have better ﬁnite sample properties (see Blundell et al., 2000). To detect possible violations of these
assumptions, we conduct Difference-in-Hansen tests for each of the system GMM regressions.23
Let Hit′ ≡ [yit hit ditXit′ ], the moment conditions used for the regression in ﬁrst-differences are
E[(vit − vit−1)Hit−s] = 0 for t ≥ 3, 2 ≤ s ≤ 3,
and the additional moment conditions for the regression in levels are given by
E[(vit + gi)(Hit−1 − Hit−2)] = 0 for t ≥ 3.
We restrict the instrumentmatrix to lag 3. Roodman (2009a) illustrates the need to introduce such a restriction, as otherwise
the problem of “instrument proliferation” may lead to severe biases. In principle, our speciﬁcation can be estimated using one-
step or two-step GMM. Whereas one-step GMM estimators use weight matrices independent of estimated parameters, the
two-step variant weights the moment conditions by a consistent estimate of their covariance matrix. Bond et al. (2001) show
that the two-step estimation is asymptotically more eﬃcient. Yet it is well known that standard errors of two-step GMM are
severely downward biased in small samples. We therefore rely on the Windmeijer (2005) ﬁnite sample corrected estimate of
the variance, which yields a more accurate inference.
5.2. Baseline results
Panel A of Table 1 reports the results of the baseline regressions. The ﬁrst column illustrates the effect of democracymeasured
by the SVMDI in a restricted model where the only covariate is the initial income level. The advantage of examining the effect of
democracy in a very reduced speciﬁcation is that the estimated parameter captures the full growth effect of democracy, leaving
all possible transmission channels open. In addition, this estimation enables the investigation of SVMDI in a broad sample of
164 countries. The subsequent columns examine the effect of the SVMDI when additional controls are introduced; however,
limited data availability for the covariates yields a decline in the number of countries included in the estimation. Panels B and
C use exactly the same speciﬁcations as Panel A, but examine the inﬂuence of initial democracy in (t − 1) as well as nonlinear
effects of democracy.
The result in Column (1) of Panel A provides a clear indication that democracy and income increases are positively and
signiﬁcantly related. The column rejects the hypothesis of convergence, reﬂecting thewell-known argument in empirical growth
research that convergence can only be detectedwhen holding constant a number of variables that distinguish the countries (see,
for instance, Barro and Sala-i Martin, 1992). For this reason, the subsequent columns gradually introduce a number of standard
22 The assumption on the initial condition is E(gi∇yi2) = 0, which holds when the process is mean stationary, i.e. yi1 = gi/(1−h)+vi with E(vi) = E(vigi) = 0.
23 A more detailed description of the estimator in the context of the empirical application can be found in Bond et al. (2001) and Roodman (2009b).
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Table 1
The effect of SVMDI on growth, dependent variable is real per capita GDP growth.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: baseline regression results
Log(GDPpc) 0.00629 −0.00848∗∗ −0.0169∗∗∗ −0.0181∗∗∗
(0.00497) (0.00332) (0.00327) (0.00308)
SVMDI 0.0249∗∗∗ 0.0292∗∗∗ 0.0137* 0.00236
(0.00887) (0.0101) (0.00719) (0.00650)
INVS 0.111∗∗∗ 0.0464 0.0453
(0.0337) (0.0330) (0.0317)
SCHOOLY 0.00261 0.00232* −0.000371
(0.00197) (0.00141) (0.00127)
Log(LIFEEX) 0.0992∗∗∗ 0.0593∗∗∗
(0.0181) (0.0176)
GOVC −0.00532 −0.00429
(0.0312) (0.0281)
INFL −0.00108 −0.00108
(0.000673) (0.000731)
OPEN 0.00737∗∗ 0.00302
(0.00317) (0.00342)
Log(FERT) −0.0332∗∗∗
(0.00640)
Panel B: the effect of initial democratization
SVMDI(t − 1) 0.0243* 0.0349∗∗∗ 0.0159 0.00643
(0.0139) (0.0124) (0.00992) (0.00768)
Panel C: non-linear effect of democracy
SVMDI 0.126∗∗ 0.0742 0.0405 0.0203
(0.0488) (0.0508) (0.0289) (0.0259)
SVMDI SQUARED −0.107∗∗ −0.0503 −0.0295 −0.0195
(0.0497) (0.0511) (0.0287) (0.0260)
SLM p-val 0.0492 0.317 0.275 0.249
Observations 1077 877 794 794
Countries 164 132 131 131
Hansen p-val 0.00000867 0.00847 0.718 0.981
Diff-in-Hansen 0.206 0.729 1.000 1.000
AR(1) p-val 0.0391 0.0730 0.110 0.113
AR(2) p-val 0.374 0.274 0.343 0.333
Instruments 40 78 154 173
Notes: Table reports two-step system GMM estimations. All estimations use period ﬁxed effects and Windmeijer-corrections, robust standard errors in paren-
theses. The instrument matrix is restricted to lag 3. Test statistics refer to Panel A. Hansen p-val. gives the p-value of Hansen’s J-test, AR(1) p-val. and AR(2)
p-val. report the p-values of the AR(1) and AR(2) test. Diff-in-Hansen reports the p-value of the C statistic of the difference in the p-values of the restricted and
the unrestricted model. The unrestricted model ignores the Arellano and Bover (1995) conditions.
∗ p < .10
∗∗ p < .05
∗∗∗ p < .01
controls in empirical growth regressions. The motivation for including additional controls is twofold. First, Hansen’s p-value
points to an omitted variable problem in the reduced regression in Column (1), which may result in a bias in the estimated
parameter. Second, we aim to investigate the mechanism through which democracy affects incomes by introducing potential
transmission channels of democracy, as suggested by Tavares andWacziarg (2001). As such, the newly introduced variables are
“bad controls” in the sense that they are part of the causal effect we aim to estimate (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). For this reason,
the more comprehensive model speciﬁcations neither capture nor attempt to capture the full growth effect of democracy.
Rather, their comparison with the reduced model in Column (1) illuminates potential mechanisms through which democracy
translates into growth.
When introducing the investment share and the average years of schooling in Column (2), conditional convergence in the
form of a negative relationship between initial incomes and growth can be observed. What is remarkable in this estimation is
the robustness of the effect of democracy, which remains signiﬁcantly positive and maintains its magnitude. In Column (3) we
incorporate life expectancy at birth, government consumption, the inﬂation rate, and the openness of countries. The effect of
democracy remains positive and signiﬁcant, but the estimated parameter shrinks slightly. The latter observation is in line with
the ﬁndings of Doucouliagos andUlubas¸og˘lu (2008), who show that inclusion of these additional covariates reduces themarginal
effect of democracy on growth. Investigating bivariate correlations between SVMDI and the newly introduced covariates, our
data implies that democracies tend to have higher life expectancies (correlation: 53% ) and a lower probability of hyperinﬂation
(−31% ). Each of these effects stimulates growth, which is why the column suggests a lower marginal impact of SVMDI. Finally,
when introducing the fertility rate, the effect of democracy becomes insigniﬁcant. As democracies tend to have substantially
lower fertility rates (correlation: −60% ), the fertility channel appears to be a crucial transmission mechanism of democracy on
growth. In countries where non-democratic structures are prevalent, the trade-off between the quantity and the education of
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the children is often resolved in favor of having more offspring. In light of binding budget constraints, families may consider this
a substitute for missing social security systems.
The test statistics given in the lower part of Table 1 highlight the high degree of validity of our results. The AR(2) p-value
illustrates that there is no second-order serial correlation in the residuals. In addition, once additional controls are introduced in
Columns (2)–(4), the p-value of Hansen’s J-test suggests that an omitted variable bias becomes increasingly unlikely. Finally, the
Difference-in-Hansen statistics highlight the validity of the instrument subsets used for the level-equation, implying superiority
of system GMM over difference GMM.
Overall, there is a clear indication of a positive effect of democracy measured by SVMDI on the growth rate. This effect
remains positive and signiﬁcant in Panel B, which investigates the impact of the initial democratization level via inclusion of
SVMDI in (t− 1). Whereas the marginal effect in the reduced speciﬁcation in Column (1) is remarkably stable in magnitude, the
inﬂuence of initial democracy tends to bemarginally stronger than current democracy in the subsequent regressions. As in Panel
A, the effect of democratization vanishes once additional controls are introduced that account for the transmission channels of
democracy, particularly the fertility rate.
Some authors have stressed a non-linear relationship between democracy and growth, arguing that democracy enhances
income increases at low levels of political freedombut depresses growth once amoderate level has been attained (see, e.g., Barro,
1996). In dictatorships, an increase in political rights may be growth enhancing due to the advantages arising from limitations
on governmental power, increases in contractual freedom, and reductions in foreign trade barriers. At high levels of democracy,
however, a further increase may eventually be an impediment to growth due to increases in redistributive efforts. Panel C deals
with the examination of a possible nonlinear effect of democracy by inclusion of the squared SVMDI score. Whereas Column
(1) provides indication of a parabolic inﬂuence of democracy on growth, the effect vanishes when additional covariates are
incorporated. The Sasabuchi–Lind–Mehlum (SLM) test of Lind and Mehlum (2010) also indicates the presence of an inverted-U
relationship in the reduced model, but does not detect a similar pattern in the more comprehensive speciﬁcations.
5.3. Sensitivity analysis I: different estimation techniques
Subsequently, we explore whether our results are sensitive to the speciﬁed estimation strategy. Table 2 provides the results
of two adjustments to Table 1. The ﬁrst adjustment is ﬁrst-difference GMM as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), and the
second method uses Within-Group estimations. Both methods have been applied in recent studies concerning the effect of
democracy on income increases (e.g. in Acemoglu et al., 2014, Rodrik and Wacziarg, 2005 and Gerring et al., 2005). The table
reports three variants of each technique. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation is the reduced model of Column (1) of Table 1, while the second
and third columns refer to the more comprehensive models reported in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1. The columns are labeled
in accordance with the variant of the baseline table that is used for speciﬁcation.
Overall, the effect of democratization is remarkably stable across the regressions conducted in Table 2, strongly resembling
the ﬁndings of the baseline estimations in signiﬁcance andmagnitude. One exception is the effect of SVMDI in the reducedmodel
reported in Column (1), where Hansen’s J-test again suggests an omitted variable problem. In addition, the Difference-in-Hansen
test reported in Table 1 indicates that the additional moment conditions used in the system GMM estimation are valid, implying
substantial eﬃciency losses when utilizing difference GMM. Note also that the number of observations declines from 1077 to
913, as difference GMM requires observations for at least three consecutive periods. This technique draws on variations over
time and eliminates the information in the equation in levels. Thus, when conducting difference GMM estimations, we expect
the main effect of democracy to appear via the transition of non-democracies to democracies. Differencing the data, however,
mainly yields losses of precisely the observations that we are interested in, i.e. observations from developing economies during
the transition process. When introducing additional controls in Column (3), the positive and signiﬁcant effect of SVMDI found
in the baseline model reappears. This is a strong indication that democracy exerts its inﬂuence via a number of transmission
channels which have opposing effects on growth. If we do not control for the effects of these variables, the estimated parameter
of SVMDI captures the neutralizing effects of the transmission variables and becomes insigniﬁcant. In accordance with the
baseline results, the impact of democracy becomes insigniﬁcant once the fertility rate is introduced.
The Within-Group (WG) estimations also strongly support the results of the baseline table. This technique resembles the
estimation strategy conducted by Gerring et al. (2005), Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) and Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008).
However, one concern is that introducing a lagged dependent variable in aWGmodel most likely results in a Nickell (1981) bias.
In addition, WG does not account for possible problems caused by endogeneity, which are typically to be expected in growth
regressions.
5.4. Sensitivity analysis II: regional and cultural waves of democratization
We now turn to another branch of sensitivity analyses, conducting IV regressions in which SVMDI is instrumented with
regional and cultural democratization. This technique, used in some more recent studies of the topic (see, e.g., Acemoglu et
al., 2014 and Madsen et al., 2015), is motivated by the empirical observation that democratization often occurs in waves.
Section 4.4 demonstrates that the SVMDI measure implies a multinational trend in democratization in the world during the
1980s and the early 1990s, which Huntington (1991, 2012) refers to as “Democracy’s Third Wave”. In addition, the renunciation
of authoritarian regimes during the Arab Spring provides more recent experience with regional entanglements in the process of
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Table 2
The effect of SVMDI on growth, different estimation techniques. Dependent variable is real per capita GDP growth.
First-difference GMM Within-Group
(Arellano–Bond) (WG)
(1) (3) (4) (1) (3) (4)
Log(GDPpc) −0.128∗∗∗ −0.0768∗∗∗ −0.0741∗∗∗ −0.0330∗∗∗ −0.0589∗∗∗ −0.0582∗∗∗
(0.0310) (0.0135) (0.0138) (0.00610) (0.00857) (0.00832)
SVMDI 0.00957 0.0227* 0.0170 0.0267∗∗∗ 0.0110* 0.00649
(0.0358) (0.0120) (0.0108) (0.00584) (0.00606) (0.00595)
INVS 0.0734∗∗ 0.0710∗∗ 0.0825∗∗∗ 0.0723∗∗
(0.0320) (0.0353) (0.0314) (0.0311)
SCHOOLY 0.00330 −0.00274 0.00823∗∗∗ 0.00302*
(0.00470) (0.00516) (0.00164) (0.00172)
Log(LIFEEX) 0.0590 0.0299 0.131∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.0481) (0.0494) (0.0215) (0.0203)
GOVC 0.0309 0.0349 −0.00489 −0.00209
(0.0339) (0.0337) (0.0211) (0.0209)
INFL −0.000809 −0.000570 −0.000732 −0.000719
(0.000638) (0.000558) (0.000545) (0.000540)
OPEN 0.00306 0.00317 −0.00158 −0.00147
(0.00478) (0.00556) (0.00388) (0.00375)
Log(FERT) −0.0327 −0.0412∗∗∗
(0.0219) (0.00857)
Observations 913 663 663 1077 794 794
Countries 164 131 131 164 131 131
Hansen p-val 0.00231 0.118 0.114
AR(1) p-val 0.0467 0.107 0.109
AR(2) p-val 0.0649 0.217 0.227
Instruments 27 99 111
F Stat 20.12 29.91 31.50
F p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Table reports ﬁrst-difference GMM (Arellano–Bond) andWithin-Group (WG) estimations. Robust standard errors in parentheses. WG uses cluster-robust
standard errors. The instrument matrix is restricted to lag 3. Hansen p-val. gives the p-value of Hansen’s J-test, AR(1) p-val. and AR(2) p-val. report the p-values
of the AR(1) and AR(2) test. F Stat gives the F statistic of the model, F p-val denotes the associated p-value.
∗ p < .10
∗∗ p < .05
∗∗∗ p < .01
democratization. Spreading from one country to another, waves of democratizationmay be a satisfactory determinant of exoge-
nous variation in democracy (Persson and Tabellini, 2009). We follow Acemoglu et al. (2014) in assuming that, conditional on
covariates, democratization in neighboring countries should be uncorrelated with a country’s national GDP.24 This allows for
the creation of external instruments of democracy which capture the effect of democratization waves.
We use two different approaches to build our external instruments. The ﬁrst approach is based on that of Acemoglu et al.
(2014), instrumenting country-year {i, t} with jack-knifed average SVMDI of region r (denoted by Zrit) in which i is located. In
order to satisfy the exclusion restriction, we leave out the value for i in the calculation of Zrit . The crucial challenge in comput-
ing Zrit is the accurate deﬁnition of the decisive regions. Whereas a narrower concept is more likely to include the countries that
directly inﬂuence national demand for democracy, it bears the risk of leaving out information necessary for accurate instru-
mentation of national SVMDI scores. In addition, arbitrary classiﬁcation of regions may cause a distortion in the results. For this
reason, Table 3 uses two different deﬁnitions of region. The ﬁrst (broad) deﬁnition refers to the country classiﬁcation of the
World Bank, the second (narrower) deﬁnition splits each continent into four disjoint regions, as illustrated in Appendix Table A2.
The second approach weights the SVMDI of the countries by their cultural distance from i. We refer to this instrument as Z˜rit .
While this procedure builds on the method proposed by Madsen et al. (2015), we use the cultural dimensions from Hofstede
(2001) to capture cultural diversity rather than linguistic differences. The advantage of Z˜rit is that the exclusion restriction may
be more likely to be fulﬁlled, as culturally similar countries are not necessarily in the vicinity of one another. The creation of the
instruments is described in detail in Appendix A1.
The estimation strategy used in Table 3 follows Acemoglu et al. (2014) and Madsen et al. (2015), using 2SLS with cluster-
robust standard errors and including country-ﬁxed and period-ﬁxed effects.25
24 Whereas we could imagine plausible reasons why this assumption may be violated—e.g. due to a decline in regional trade or capital ﬂows—Acemoglu et al.
(2014) provide evidence that controlling for such effects has little impact on the estimation results.
25 Whereas the authors of both studies use real per capita GDP as the dependent variable in their IV regressions, the dependent variable in Table 3 is again the
growth rate of real GDP per capita to ensure comparability with the baseline results. Note that exact replication with inclusion of SVMDI as democracy variable
yields quite similar results. Note also that the results of a more direct comparison to the baseline table achieved by inclusion of our external instruments in the
System GMM estimations strongly resemble the baseline ﬁndings.
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Table 3
The effect of SVMDI on growth, IV estimations. Dependent variable is real per capita GDP growth.
Regional democracy Regional democracy Cultural democracy
(World Bank) (Narrower deﬁnition) (Culturally-weighted)
(1) (4) (1) (4) (1) (4)
Panel A: 2SLS regression results
Log(GDPpc) −0.0537∗∗∗ −0.0643∗∗∗ −0.0482∗∗∗ −0.0664∗∗∗ −0.0354∗∗∗ −0.0509∗∗∗
(0.0106) (0.0128) (0.00831) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.00804)
SVMDI 0.245∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.0854∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.0458
(0.0536) (0.0774) (0.0314) (0.0287) (0.0602) (0.0451)
INVS 0.0847* 0.0842∗∗ 0.0650*
(0.0460) (0.0387) (0.0348)
SCHOOLY 0.000792 0.00231 0.00206
(0.00295) (0.00212) (0.00209)
Log(LIFEEX) 0.117∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.0946∗∗
(0.0305) (0.0196) (0.0386)
GOVC −0.0384 −0.0282 −0.0418*
(0.0350) (0.0267) (0.0244)
INFL −0.000694 −0.000614 −0.00103
(0.000544) (0.000556) (0.000811)
OPEN −0.0164* −0.00963* −0.00787
(0.00901) (0.00513) (0.00566)
Log(FERT) −0.00758 −0.0259∗∗ −0.0385∗∗∗
(0.0208) (0.0121) (0.0103)
Panel B: ﬁrst-stage regression results
Democracy wave 0.5030*** 0.3929∗∗∗ 0.5900∗∗∗ 0.5160∗∗∗ 0.5980∗∗∗ 0.05182
(t − 1) (0.9224) (0.1200) (0.0809) (0.0961) (0.1585) (0.0495)
SW F-Stat 23.74 10.90 53.20 28.84 14.23 4.64
Stock–Yogo 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53
Kleibergen–Paap 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.040
Observations 937 688 937 688 574 466
Countries 164 131 164 131 99 87
F p-val 0.000000424 1.28e−13 1.12e−10 1.64e−21 0.000611 2.83e−16
Notes: Table reports 2SLS estimations, where SVMDI is instrumentedwith regional and cultural democracy. All estimations include country ﬁxed effects, cluster-
robust standard errors in parentheses. Test statistics and number of included countries refer to Panel A. F p-val gives the p-value of the F Statistic of the reported
model. Additional statistics reported in Panel B represent the Sanderson–Windmeijer F Statistic (SW F-Stat), the Stock Yogo critical value for 25%maximal IV size
(Stock–Yogo), and the p-value of the Kleibergen–Paap test for underidentiﬁcation (Kleibergen–Paap). Labels of the columns refer to the respective speciﬁcation
reported in the baseline estimations in Table 1.
∗ p < .10
∗∗ p < .05
∗∗∗ p < .01
Panel A of Table 3 reports the 2SLS results, with ﬁrst-stage outcomes presented in Panel B. The results from this exercise
strongly support the positive effect of democracy found in Table 1. However, when instrumenting SVMDI with regional democ-
ratizationwaves, the reducedmodels imply an increase in themarginal effect of SVMDI from 0.0249 in the baseline speciﬁcation
to 0.245 in Table 3. The results also seem to be relatively unaffected by the classiﬁcation of regions r, as both the categorization
of the World Bank and the narrower concept yield outcomes strongly comparable in their signiﬁcance. However, when using
the narrower classiﬁcation of regions, the marginal effect is smaller. Instrumenting the SVMDI variable via culturally-weighted
waves of democracy yields a heterogeneous picture. The marginal effect in the reduced model strongly resembles the effect
detected in Column (1). Unlike in the estimations based on regional instruments, the SVMDI ceases to be signiﬁcant once the
fertility rate is introduced in the model.26
Panel B highlights a strong and signiﬁcant effect of regional democratization waves in t − 1 on national SVMDI scores, sug-
gesting that Zrit−1 is a valid instrument for SVMDI.
27 The Sanderson andWindmeijer (2016) weak instrument F-test (SW) implies
that regional and cultural waves of democracy are strong instruments for national democracy. Likewise, the Kleibergen and
Paap (2006) test rejects the null of under-identiﬁcation in each speciﬁcation. However, the ﬁrst-stage regressions also highlight
that Z˜rit−1 is less valid than Z
r
it−1. In the reduced model, cultural waves of democratization are signiﬁcantly related to national
democracy. In the comprehensive model speciﬁcation in the last column, we cannot ﬁnd any contribution of cultural democracy
waves to the SVMDI in country i. Meanwhile, the SW test points to a weak instrument problem.
Comparing the outcomes of Table 3 to a similar analysis conducted by Acemoglu et al. (2014), we ﬁnd that utilization of
SVMDI is superior to the application of a rough dichotomous measure, as it yields much more signiﬁcant results.28 This is in
26 Similar to the baseline results reported in Table 1, SVMDI signiﬁcantly contributes to income increases in each speciﬁcation other than model (4).
27 We instrument SVMDI by only one lag of Zrit . As with Acemoglu et al. (2014), we ﬁnd only slightly differing effects when usingmore lags of Z
r
it as instruments.
28 The same increase in signiﬁcance occurs if we directly replicate the utilized speciﬁcations, using Log(GDPpc) as dependent variable.
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line with Elkins (2000), who shows that graded measures of democracy are superior to dichotomous classiﬁcations in empirical
political science research. In our case, the superiority is the result of the substantial increase in the level of detail enabled
by the Support Vector approach. Even when controlling for regional democratization waves, the strong heterogeneity in the
subset of democratic (autocratic) countries—which necessarily occurs when conducting a binary classiﬁcation—results in a loss
of information that causes a distortion in the estimated results. Note also that the IV approach is likely to suffer from a Nickell
bias unless the (bold) assumption holds that E[Zrit−1eit] = 0 and eit is serially uncorrelated.
5.5. The effect of alternative democracy indicators on growth
Whereas the previous results provide strong evidence for a positive effect of democracy on growthwhen applying the SVMDI
measure, we are interested in determining if these results are superior when compared with estimations which use alternative
indices of democracy. Whenever the available indices lack observations for recent periods (e.g. Vanhanen and Lindell, 2012) or
have not yet been made available (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2014), we calculate missing values according to the algorithms reported
in the original documentations. We conduct two different estimation techniques, difference GMM and system GMM.
Difference GMM has been used in a number of recent studies (e.g. in Gerring et al., 2005 and Acemoglu et al., 2014). The
general idea of this technique, shown in Eq. (5), is to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity by ﬁrst-differencing the speciﬁed
model, i.e. ﬁrst-differencing Eq. (4). However, this transformation removes the information in the equation in levels, so that the
estimation relies solely on the within-country information. In the context of the relationship between democracy and growth,
this means that the estimated parameter essentially captures the effect of democratization within countries, i.e. the process of
transformation towards or away from democracy.
Panel A of Table 4 illustrates the results of the difference GMM estimations, replicating the speciﬁcation of Column (3) in
Table 2 using SVMDI and six commonly used democracy indicators. To exclude the possibility of a sample selection bias, the
estimations rely on the set of observations that are available for all indicators. As in Section 5.3, the SVMDI detects a positive
and signiﬁcant effect of the democratization process within countries on their growth rate. However, neither of the alter-
native indicators suggests a similarly signiﬁcant inﬂuence, a result which strongly resembles the effects identiﬁed in many
recent studies.29 Since (non-)democratic countries differ in numerous historical, cultural, political, and institutional aspects,
ﬁrst-differencing the model requires indicators that react quite sensitively to political events in order to capture the effect
of transition towards democracy within countries. As illustrated in Section 4.5, hitherto existing democracy indicators are
unable to react with suﬃcient sensitivity to political events and regime changes. For this reason, raw measures of democracy—
particularly dichotomous indices—provide little indication of an income-enhancing effect of democratization, as Table 4 clearly
demonstrates.
Since most of the variation in traditional democracy indicators stems from the cross-section rather than the time-dimension,
the utilization of additional orthogonality conditions proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) is
beneﬁcial, as these additional restrictions ensure that some of the information in the equation in levels is maintained. With
respect to the estimation of the democracy-growth nexus, this implies that the estimated parameters also capture the between
variation, i.e. the variation in the level of democracy between the countries in the sample. In addition, as difference GMM
requires information from at least three consecutive periods in order for a country to be included in the estimation, the exploita-
tion of the Arellano and Bover (1995) orthogonality conditions also yields an increase in the number of observations. This is
crucial, as we might expect a loss of observations for developing countries in particular, which possess a higher within varia-
tion in democratization than advanced economies. Panel B of Table 4 reports the results of system GMM using the same model
speciﬁcations as in Panel A. What we observe is a change in the picture. The SVMDI index maintains its positive and strongly
signiﬁcant effect on growth. Additionally, four of the six alternative indices now point to a similar inﬂuence of democracy on
growth.
Overall, the results of Table 4 broadly indicate that democracy is positively related to long-run growth. However, only the
SVMDI indicates that the transition to democracy is beneﬁcial to growth. From an economic perspective, this implies that small
steps towards democracy already lead to long-run increases in living standards, even if political rights in the countries do not
catch upwith those of established democracies. Meanwhile, reverse waves of democratization are likely to be harmful to growth
in the long-run. Once the econometric speciﬁcation allows for the investigation of differences in the democracy level across
countries, the positive effect of democracy can be observed as a clear empirical pattern, even if themodel relies on rawmeasures
of democracy.
6. The transmission channels of democracy
In line with Tavares and Wacziarg (2001), we previously suspected that political rights exert their inﬂuence on growth via a
number of transmission channels. This section is concerned with a more in-depth analysis of these mechanisms.
29 Note that this result also occurs if we use other model speciﬁcations, e.g. Column (4) of Table 2 and Columns (2)–(4) of the baseline estimations of Table 1.
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Table 4
The effect of different democracy indicators on growth. Dependent variable is real per capita GDP growth.
SVMDI POLITY VANHANEN ACEMOGLU FREEDOM BOIX UDS
Panel A: difference GMM estimations
Democracy 0.0252* 0.0006 0.0008 0.0082 0.0085 0.0075 0.0085
(0.0149) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0116) (0.0067) (0.0104) (0.0072)
Observations 616 616 616 616 616 616 616
Countries 122 122 122 122 122 122 122
Hansen p-val 0.214 0.170 0.0968 0.221 0.210 0.199 0.226
AR(1) p-val 0.118 0.120 0.116 0.122 0.115 0.120 0.115
AR(2) p-val 0.229 0.240 0.237 0.229 0.220 0.231 0.236
Instruments 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
Panel B: system GMM estimations
Democracy 0.0203∗∗ 0.0009∗∗ 0.0006∗∗∗ 0.0119∗∗ 0.0058 0.0064 0.0070∗∗
(0.0086) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0054) (0.0036) (0.0055) (0.0034)
Observations 737 737 737 737 737 737 737
Countries 122 122 122 122 122 122 122
Hansen p-val 0.946 0.924 0.904 0.945 0.959 0.930 0.949
Diff-Hansen 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
AR(1) p-val 0.121 0.120 0.118 0.122 0.119 0.122 0.118
AR(2) p-val 0.345 0.348 0.352 0.342 0.337 0.344 0.346
Instruments 154 154 154 154 154 154 154
Notes: Table reports two-step system GMM estimations. The speciﬁcations of the covariates refer to Column (3) of Table 2 (Panel A) and Column (3) of Table 1
(Panel B). All estimations use period ﬁxed effects and Windmeijer-corrections, robust standard errors in parentheses. The instrument matrix is restricted to lag
3. Hansen p-val. gives the p-value of Hansen’s J-test, AR(1) p-val. and AR(2) p-val. report the p-values of the AR(1) and AR(2) test. Diff-in-Hansen reports the C
statistic of the difference in the p-values of the restricted and the unrestricted model. The unrestricted model ignores the Arellano and Bover (1995) conditions.
∗ p < .10
∗∗ p < .05
∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 5 illustrates the effect of democracy on schooling, investment, redistribution, and fertility. Each of these variables
plays an important role in the growth process; however, it is crucial to disentangle the effects of democracy from those of
credit availability. Whereas democracy may increase schooling and investment via a more equal distribution of opportunities
and fewer government interventions in the private sector, it simultaneously contributes to better credit availability. It has been
emphasized in the growth literature that mitigation of credit market imperfections yields an increase in education and physical
capital investments (see, e.g., Galor andMoav, 2004, Galor and Zeira, 1993). For this reason, we specify twomodels for each of the
transmission variables: the ﬁrst variant uses the variables of the speciﬁcations in Table 1, while the second variant additionally
introduces private credit to GDP (CREDIT) as a proxy for credit availability.30 As expected, the correlation between SVMDI and
CREDIT is high (50%).
The empirical framework follows Acemoglu et al. (2014), conductingWithin-Group (Panel A) and 2SLS (Panel B) estimations.
The latter once again uses regional waves of democratization as external instruments for domestic democracy. Due to the high
probability of a potential Nickell (1981) bias in our “small” T panel, we do not include lagged dependent variables. SVMDI enters
in the regressions with a lag of one period to ensure that causality runs from democracy to the transmission variables, rather
than the reverse.
The ﬁrst transmission channel in Table 5 is concerned with education. The results imply that wealthier economies exhibit
a higher average level of school attainment. In addition, better health as measured by life expectancy enhances education. The
trade-off between the quantity and the education of children is clearly visible, as we can observe a signiﬁcantly negative impact
of fertility on education. Controlling for these effects, the inﬂuence of democratization is positive in the Within-Group estima-
tions and becomes signiﬁcant in Column (2) when we introduce CREDIT. Likewise, SVMDI is signiﬁcant in both speciﬁcations of
the 2SLS estimations. The results imply that better credit availability softens the budget constraints of the household, thereby
contributing to a higher level of education of individuals. However, even when controlling for this effect, democracy acts as an
additional source of educational improvements.
The second transmission channel illustrates the effect of SVMDI on investment, which is positive in both the Within-Group
and the 2SLS estimations. Apparently, democratic structures and political rights facilitate both national and foreign invest-
ments and capital inﬂows. These ﬁndings are in line with the well-known results of Perotti (1996), who ﬁnds that political
stability—which is considerably greater in democracies (Feng, 1997)—has a huge impact on investment and growth. CREDIT
has no signiﬁcant effect on investment, suggesting that the positive contribution of the SVMDI stems largely from foreign
investments, which are not necessarily ﬁnanced by loans acquired in the target country. To examine a possible negative effect
of an increase in political rights in countries with a medium or high level of SVMDI, Column (1) also incorporates the level
30 The data source is World Bank (2014b).
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Table 5
The transmission channels of democracy.
Schooling Investment Redistribution Fertility
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Panel A: Within-Group regression results
Log(GDPpc) 1.078∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗ 0.0136 0.00717 0.000527 −0.00594 0.000866 −0.0550*
(0.197) (0.196) (0.0216) (0.0229) (0.00597) (0.00545) (0.0342) (0.0329)
SVMDI(t − 1) 0.252 0.327∗∗ 0.0375∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗ 0.00356 0.00264 −0.107∗∗ −0.0494
(0.172) (0.149) (0.0140) (0.0155) (0.00368) (0.00407) (0.0426) (0.0341)
INVS 0.102 −0.0372 −0.0758∗∗∗ −0.0755∗∗∗ −0.310∗∗ −0.361∗∗∗
(0.679) (0.680) (0.0207) (0.0211) (0.143) (0.133)
SCHOOLY 0.00277 −0.000336 0.00582∗∗∗ 0.00505∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗ −0.120∗∗∗
(0.00588) (0.00614) (0.00150) (0.00138) (0.0164) (0.0164)
Log(LIFEEX) 2.051∗∗ 1.579∗∗ 0.150* 0.154* 0.0275∗∗ 0.0222∗∗ −0.164 −0.175
(0.840) (0.767) (0.0826) (0.0907) (0.0117) (0.0111) (0.139) (0.132)
GOVC −0.900 −0.810 −0.120 −0.151* 0.00220 0.00232 0.0772 0.0735
(0.708) (0.681) (0.0927) (0.0867) (0.00912) (0.00886) (0.104) (0.0950)
INFL −0.0142∗∗ −0.0113 −0.000267 −0.00129∗∗ 0.000416 0.000397 0.000465 0.000798
(0.00679) (0.00743) (0.00140) (0.000618) (0.000284) (0.000315) (0.000741) (0.000653)
Log(FERT) −2.745∗∗∗ −3.056∗∗∗ −0.0681∗∗ −0.0834∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗ 0.0124*
(0.296) (0.286) (0.0295) (0.0299) (0.00681) (0.00653)
OPEN 0.0842 0.0995 −0.00415 −0.00877 0.00500 0.00447 0.00178 0.00948
(0.120) (0.109) (0.0106) (0.0100) (0.00344) (0.00331) (0.0215) (0.0185)
CREDIT 0.671∗∗∗ 0.00412 0.0128∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(0.218) (0.0184) (0.00578) (0.0430)
REDIST −0.688∗∗∗
(0.189)
Panel B: 2SLS regression results
SVMDI(t − 1) 1.512∗∗∗ 1.584∗∗∗ 0.0722∗∗ 0.0825∗∗ 0.0138* 0.0135 −0.368∗∗∗ −0.304∗∗∗
(0.415) (0.417) (0.0301) (0.0367) (0.00774) (0.00868) (0.0962) (0.109)
Observations 688 666 572 666 572 556 688 666
Countries 131 129 124 129 124 122 131 129
R-squared 0.613 0.650 0.243 0.206 0.129 0.149 0.538 0.576
F Stat 44.62 47.56 8.305 8.883 3.706 3.460 31.53 32.41
F p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Notes: Table reportsWithin-Group and 2SLS estimations. Model speciﬁcation of the 2SLS estimations is identical to theWithin-Group variant. 2SLS uses regional
democracy (narrower deﬁnition) as instruments, for a description see Section 5.4. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Test statistics refer to the
Within-Group models. F Stat reports the F-test statistic of joint signiﬁcance of the model, F p-val gives the p-value of the F-test.
∗ p < .10
∗∗ p < .05
∗∗∗ p < .01
of effective redistribution, measured by the difference of the Gini coeﬃcient of household incomes before and after taxes
and transfers.31 The results show a strongly signiﬁcant impact of redistribution on investments, where a greater amount of
redistribution is negatively related to investment activity. This, in principle, supports the hypothesis that a higher level of
democratization may be an impediment to growth. However, this mechanism only comes into play if democracy enhances
redistribution.
This redistribution-enhancing effect is investigated in the third branch of transmission analyses. We observe that redistri-
bution is lower in countries with a higher average level of education. Meanwhile, countries with longer life expectancy, higher
government consumption and higher fertility rates typically tend to redistribute more. Controlling for these effects, we ﬁnd
no additional contribution of SVMDI to redistribution in the Within-Group regressions, and only a weak positive effect in the
2SLS estimations. This implies that the strong bivariate correlation between SVMDI and REDIST (63%) is not due to an inher-
ent causality running from democracy to redistribution, but is the result of numerous variables that are affected by democracy.
The ambiguous effect of democracy on redistribution strongly resembles the recent ﬁndings of Acemoglu et al. (2013). How-
ever, Feld and Schnellenbach (2014) emphasize that the manner in which income is redistributed differs between countries,
depending on their respective constitutional framework.
The last transmission channel deals with the effect of democracy on fertility. The ﬁrst column highlights that democratization
yields a signiﬁcant decline in fertility rates. The process of democratization is often accompanied by a substantial increase in
the size of social security systems and a reduction of uncertainty due to greater political stability, both of which reduce families’
incentives to have children as a substitute for social protection. However, it is crucial to disentangle the different effects of
democracy and credit availability, as is illustrated in Column (2).When holding constant CREDIT, the effect of democracy shrinks,
31 Data source is the SWIID v5, documented in Solt (2009) and Solt (2016).
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but remains negatively and—in case of the 2SLS estimations—signiﬁcantly associated with fertility. Better credit availability
increases the fertility rate, as access to capital markets alleviates the otherwise binding trade-off between the quantity and the
education of children.
Summarizing the ﬁndings, we observe that democracy exerts its inﬂuence on growth via better education, higher invest-
ment shares, and lower fertility rates. In contrast, we ﬁnd only minor evidence for a redistribution-enhancing effect of
democratization.32
7. Conclusions
Possessing reliable measurements of democracy is essential for achieving a sound understanding of democratization and
its effects on political and economic outcomes. The overwhelming majority of existing indicators, however, are fraught with
methodical problems. Not infrequently, scholars using such rough measurements will ﬁnd that an inappropriate democracy
indicator is the Achilles’ heel of empirical analyses, particularly when working with panel data.
By maximizing comparability for the broadest possible sample of countries, the SVMDI algorithm facilitates empirical inves-
tigations of democracy. A direct result of this methodological improvement is a substantial increase in the level of detail
in comparison with established approaches. In addition, the algorithm places the crucial question of how to aggregate the
underlying attributes—undoubtedly the main weak point of alternative indicators—into the context of a nonlinear optimiza-
tion problem, thereby obtaining much more consistent and plausible results. The unprecedented potential of machine learning
enables researchers to make highly accurate classiﬁcations, and may also provide very promising results for various problems
in the ﬁeld of economics beyond its utilization for measuring democracy.
Using the SVMDI, we ﬁnd a robust positive inﬂuence of democracy on long-run economic growth. Our results suggest that the
ambiguity in recent studies stems from two main sources. First, in light of the diversity of political institutions across countries,
the lack of a suﬃcient reaction of traditional democracy indicators to political events and regime changes only allows for a
rough classiﬁcation of democracy. Second, when using empirical models that rely on the within-country variation, the problem
of inadequate and insensitive measurement of democracy becomes particularly severe.
When digging deeper into the democracy-growth nexus, we ﬁnd only minor indication of a nonlinear relationship between
the variables. The analysis of the transmission channels through which democracy exerts its inﬂuence on growth illustrates
why: while democratic countries typically have better educated populations, higher investment shares, and lower fertility rates,
we ﬁnd little evidence of a redistribution-enhancing effect of democratization.
Taken together, our results emphasize that democratic structures facilitate economic growth in the long-run, and that their
implementation may be a beneﬁcial strategy for less-developed countries. However, countries differ in numerous cultural, his-
torical, political, and institutional dimensions. Isolating the growth effect of different aspects of democratic institutions may
thus be an advantageous ﬁeld of future research. Likewise, it would be beneﬁcial to acquire a deeper empirical understanding
of the transmission channels of democracy, particularly with regard to human capital, inequality, and redistribution.
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A1. Description of the external instruments used in the IV regression
Let R = {1, . . . ,R} denote a set of regions, where each country i belongs exactly to one region r. In addition, let Nrt be
the number of countries in region r at period t and dit denote the level of democracy in country-year {i, t}. Then the regional
democratization wave—i.e. instrumental variable Zrit—is calculated via
Zrit =
1
Nrt − 1
∑
{j=i|r′=r,r′∈R}
djt.
32 We also do not ﬁnd any robust effect of democracy on health, even though both variables reveal a high bivariate correlation (53%). What we do ﬁnd,
however, is a signiﬁcant impact of initial wealth on life expectancy. Whereas we would suspect that democratic countries provide better public health services,
the estimations imply that incomes are much more decisive for health than regime type. However, life expectancy may be a poor proxy in this context, as
changes in this variable may only occur a considerable amount of time after democratization has taken place.
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To build the culturally weighted instrumental variable of democracy, we use four of the cultural dimensions—Power Distance
(PD), Individualism (IN), Masculinity (MC), and Uncertainty Avoidance (UA)—provided by Hofstede (2001) and calculate our
instrument via a four-stage approach. First, we calculate the Euclidean distance
dij =
√
(PDi − PDj)2 + (INi − INj)2 + (MCi − MCj)2 + (UAi − UAj)2 (A.1)
for each set of countries {i, j}. Subsequently, we normalize dij to the interval from 0 to 1 by applying the standard formula
d¯i,j =
maxi,j{di,j} − di,j
maxi,j{di,j} − mini,j{di,j} , (A.2)
which is used, for instance, for generation of the Human Development Index (see United Nations, 2013). In the third stage, we
calculate the cultural weights ki,j via
ki,j =
d¯i,j∑
k=id¯i,k
(A.3)
to ensure that the weights sum up to 1 for each country i. Finally, the external instrument Z˜rit—which equals the culturally
weighted democracy score for a particular country-year {i, t}−is computed as follows
Z˜rit =
∑
k=i
ki,kSVMDIk,t. (A.4)
Table A2
Classiﬁcation of regions in the IV regression.
I. Asia
Central Asia Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Georgia, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
East-Southeast Asia Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Japan, Laos, Myanmar, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam
Arabic region Bahrain, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
Oceania Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu
II. Europe
Central-Northern Europe Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom
South-Southwest Europe Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain
East Europe Belarus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine
Balkan States Albania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia
III. Africa
North Africa Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia
Central-East Africa Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan
West Africa Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo
Southern Africa Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
IV. America
North America Bahamas, Canada, United States
Central America Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama
South America Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela
Caribbean Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent,
Trinidad and Tobago
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Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.05.005.
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